

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 02084-85  
19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: George Kolt  
National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 17 April 1985. If there are any significant amendments or additions you would wish to make, please let me know.

2. Next month's warning meeting will be on 22 May 1985 at 1015 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and call [redacted] with names of the attendees by noon, 21 May 1985.

25X1

3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 13 May 1985.

  
George Kolt

25X1

Memorandum is Classified  
CONFIDENTIAL When Separated  
From Attachment

CL BY SIGNER  
DECL OAD  
DERV MULTIPLE

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1  
25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1  
25X1The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George Kolt  
National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: April Warning and Forecast Report

I. Main Discussion ItemsA. The Antonov Trial: The Likely Impact in Europe1. Discussion

The start of Italy's trial of Bulgarian Airline official Sergei Antonov in late May will revive polemics about Soviet-Bulgarian involvement in the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul four years ago. But even if there is a conviction with attendant implicit demonstration of Soviet involvement, Western Europeans will oppose sanctions against Moscow and Sofia and would prefer that the whole matter be forgotten. If the US takes the lead and public reaction is strong, the West Europeans might swallow their misgivings to express common reprehension but they would probably do so with an eye to a rapid return to "normalcy" in East-West contacts.

In any event, the trial promises to extend into fall 1985--if not longer--and no official will publicly address the issue until the Italian judicial process is complete. As the

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1  
25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1  
25X1

main Western protagonist, Italy could well react to a conviction with another diplomatic response--similar to the recall of its Ambassador to Bulgaria in 1982. We also think that Turkey, angered over Sofia's abuse of its Turkish minority in recent months, might be willing to assist in orchestrating private reactions.

Unless it turns out well for them, the trial will be an embarrassment for the East and Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov will have good reason to fear being made the scapegoat. Bulgaria is preparing a propaganda blitz--including a mock trial of Western "slanderers"--to be held concurrently with the Antonov trial. Their target probably will be the CIA rather than the USG as a whole because Sofia wants to preserve chances for more US trade. Sofia's recent press statements questioned Antonov's mental stability--apparently to preempt a possible admission of complicity in the shooting or in drugs and arms smuggling.

25X1

## B. The Economic Summit and the Strategic Defense Initiative

### 1. Discussion

The summit leaders will likely be of two minds about broaching SDI in Bonn. On the one hand, some fear the issue would dominate the agenda and none want to take a public position at this time because of divisions at home. On the other hand, the Europeans will probably want more US assurances on issues like technology sharing and more explicit details regarding US planning--but only in private.

Divisions within individual countries and within ruling coalitions and parties are serious. Questions remain over US plans for development, deployment, and strategic implications. All this makes it difficult for governments to formulate their positions. (Some analysts believe our principal allies are

-2-

TOP SECRET

25X1  
25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

coming to grips with SDI's conceptual issues at a pace faster than we now recognize.) Many analysts believe Japan's participation in SDI R&D--would push the other allies to view SDI more favorably, if only for commercial reasons. But all agree that it would be counterproductive to press for a joint public position in Bonn.

Some West Europeans--like Helmut Kohl--may request that the US be more flexible on the issue in the Geneva talks. However, the chance of a common front urging that the US to use SDI as a "bargaining chip" seems to be decreasing.

25X1

25X1

-3-

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

25X1

  
George Kolt

-4-

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**